Executive Summary / Key Takeaways

• A Dying Logistics Business Masquerading as a Media Startup: OZ Vision Inc. (UNXP) generated just $54,232 in annual revenue from its legacy logistics operation while losing $65,601, yet commands a $35 million market capitalization based on an aspirational "modern media and entertainment house" narrative that exists only on paper.

• Capital Constraint is the Entire Story: Despite acquiring $13 million in intangible assets—including a Nevada combat sports promoter license and media rights to 40 shows—management explicitly states they "lack the capital resources to plan and hold such events," rendering the media segment worthless until they can raise substantial funds, likely at massive dilution.

• Binary Outcome with Asymmetric Downside: The company faces a stark choice: execute a highly dilutive equity raise to fund its media pivot, or watch its logistics business evaporate and face insolvency. With $10,380 in cash, a $1.1 million payable to a significant stockholder, and a going concern warning from auditors, equity holders face near-total loss risk with minimal upside visibility.

• Competitive Position is Non-Existent: Against logistics peers like Old Dominion and XPO that generate billions in revenue with 15-25% operating margins, UNXP's micro-scale operation lacks any technological moat, pricing power, or operational efficiency, making its legacy business indefensible.

• Valuation Defies Fundamental Reality: Trading at 396 times sales while peers trade at 1-6 times sales, UNXP's market price reflects pure speculation rather than business value. No traditional valuation framework applies to a company with negative gross margins, no cash flow, and an unexecutable strategic pivot.

Setting the Scene: From Parcel Delivery to Pipe Dreams

OZ Vision Inc., originally incorporated as United Express Inc. on June 23, 2017, began as a modest transportation and logistics provider moving merchandise across the United States. For six years, the company operated in relative obscurity, generating minimal revenue from basic dispatch and parcel services. This foundational period established a business model that was not competitive then and has only deteriorated since.

The strategic inflection point arrived on September 21, 2023, when the company acquired Jebour Two Limited, whose subsidiary Fighting Leagues LV held assets for promoting combat sports events. This acquisition brought three potentially valuable assets: a Nevada State Athletic Commission Professional Promoter license (enabling live Kickboxing, Boxing, and MMA shows in Nevada), Producers Lifetime rights to 40 previously held shows with worldwide broadcast rights, and production equipment. The company amended its Articles of Incorporation on May 5, 2024, to become OZ Vision Inc., with FINRA approving the name change for trading purposes on September 23, 2025.

This timeline reveals a critical pattern: nearly two years have passed since the acquisition, yet the media segment has produced zero revenue. The company describes itself as a "360-service model" media and entertainment house with in-house production, post-production capabilities, and live event promotion. But descriptions without execution are merely marketing. The logistics segment continues to wither, down 14.8% year-over-year to $24,800 in Q3 2025, while the media segment remains a static collection of intangible assets gathering dust.

The industry structure highlights the challenges. Logistics is a capital-intensive, scale-driven business where technology and network density determine survival. Competitors like Old Dominion Freight Line command 10-12% of the $800 billion U.S. LTL market through superior route optimization and asset efficiency, generating $1.1 billion in operating cash flow annually. XPO Inc. leverages tech-enabled brokerage and intermodal services to produce $164 million in quarterly operating income. Against these giants, UNXP's $54,000 in annual revenue and lack of proprietary technology make it economically non-viable. The media and entertainment business, meanwhile, requires substantial upfront capital for event production, talent acquisition, and marketing—resources UNXP simply does not possess.

Technology, Products, and Strategic Differentiation: Assets Without Activation

UNXP's technology stack is effectively non-existent. The logistics operation relies on basic dispatch and parcel management—commoditized services offered by thousands of small carriers nationwide. There is no evidence of proprietary route optimization software, automated tracking systems, or any technological edge that would justify customer loyalty. The company's gross margin of negative 4.15% confirms it cannot even price its services above direct costs, a clear signal of zero differentiation.

The media segment's assets, while theoretically valuable, remain dormant. The Nevada promoter license is classified as an indefinite-lived intangible asset with a $12.57 million carrying value, but a license without capital is like a car without fuel. The media rights to 40 shows, valued at $530,000 and amortized over three years, are depreciating assets that generate no cash flow. The production and stage equipment, worth $610,417, was "not placed into service during the period ended September 30, 2025." This is not a strategic pivot; it is asset accumulation without activation.

Management's commentary reveals the stark reality: "At present we lack the capital resources to plan and hold such events." This admission is the entire story. A media company that cannot afford to produce events is not a media company. The "360-service model" is a vision without a viable path to execution. Unlike true technology-driven media companies that leverage digital platforms to reduce capital intensity, UNXP's model requires traditional event production spending—venue rental, fighter purses, marketing, broadcast infrastructure—none of which can be deferred indefinitely.

The absence of any R&D spending or innovation pipeline further underscores the point. Competitors like XPO invest heavily in AI-driven logistics optimization, while UNXP's operating expenses of just $7,769 in Q3 2025 (down from $31,313) reflect cost-cutting, not investment. There are no disclosed technology initiatives, no patent filings, no proprietary platforms. The company's only "moat" is a promoter license it cannot afford to use.

Financial Performance & Segment Dynamics: A Business in Free Fall

The financial statements read like a case study in terminal decline. For the three months ended September 30, 2025, revenue fell 14.8% to $24,800. Annual revenue stands at $54,232. More telling is the profit math: the company reported a Q3 net profit of $3,031, but this resulted entirely from slashing operating expenses to $7,769, down 75% year-over-year. This is not operational improvement; it is asset starvation.

The annual picture is bleaker: a net loss of $65,601 on $54,232 revenue means UNXP lost $1.21 for every dollar of sales. The gross margin of negative 4.15% indicates it costs more to deliver services than customers pay, leading to a negative operating margin. Return on equity of negative 0.35% and return on assets of negative 0.08% confirm capital destruction.

Cash flow tells the same story. Annual operating cash flow was negative $15,549, though Q3 showed a positive $10,328, likely from working capital changes rather than operational health. Free cash flow mirrors operating cash flow, confirming no material capital expenditures. The company is not investing in growth; it is treading water.

The balance sheet is a horror show. Cash of $10,380 as of September 30, 2025, represents approximately four months of operating expenses at the Q3 run rate. Current ratio of 0.01 and quick ratio of 0.01 indicate complete illiquidity. Accounts payable includes $1.10 million owed to a significant stockholder, suggesting related-party financing that may not be available going forward. The $12.57 million promoter license sits on the books as an intangible asset, but its realizable value is zero without capital to monetize it.

The going concern warning in the financial statements is not boilerplate; it is a factual assessment of imminent insolvency. Management acknowledges dependence on the logistics business for survival while that business shrinks. The media segment, touted as the future, is dead in the water without a capital injection that would likely wipe out existing equity holders.

Outlook, Management Guidance, and Execution Risk: A Bridge to Nowhere

Management's guidance is effectively a confession of strategic paralysis. They anticipate that "any potential earnings from such events may not be realized for up to 6-9 months," but this timeline is meaningless without capital. The company is evaluating ASU No. 2020-6 but "don't expect to have a significant impact"—a minor accounting issue when the existential crisis is solvency.

The outlook is binary and bleak. Either UNXP raises substantial capital through highly dilutive equity issuance (given its $35 million market cap, any meaningful raise would require issuing 50-100% of the company) or it finds a strategic partner willing to fund the media venture. With no track record in media production, no revenue, and a failing logistics business, the likelihood of favorable terms is near zero.

Execution risk is total. The company has never produced a combat sports event, has no relationships with talent or broadcasters, and no demonstrated ability to sell media rights. The 40 shows in its library are historical content of unknown quality and marketability. Even if capital were secured, the media business would face entrenched competitors like UFC's parent Endeavor Group (EDR) and boxing promoters with decades of experience and established distribution.

The logistics business offers no fallback. Its revenue decline reflects a limited customer base that management admits they have "not been able to diversify." In an industry where scale determines survival, UNXP's micro-scale operation cannot compete on price or service. The business is in run-off mode, generating insufficient cash to fund even its own minimal existence.

Risks and Asymmetries: Near-Term Insolvency vs. Theoretical Upside

The primary risk is not that the media pivot fails—it is that the company ceases to exist before the pivot can begin. The going concern warning, combined with $10,380 in cash and a $1.1 million payable, suggests insolvency within months, not quarters. Auditors have explicitly questioned the company's ability to continue operations, which typically precedes bankruptcy or forced restructuring.

Related-party risk compounds the problem. The $1.10 million payable to a significant stockholder indicates the company has been relying on insider financing. If this party withdraws support or demands repayment, UNXP has no recourse. The concentration of control among insiders may also mean any capital raise will be structured to benefit them at the expense of public shareholders.

The media assets themselves are a risk. The $12.57 million carrying value of the promoter license appears arbitrary and likely impaired. Without revenue generation, the indefinite-lived intangible should be tested for impairment, potentially resulting in a massive writedown that would wipe out the remaining book equity of $0.43 per share. The media rights amortize over three years, meaning the $530,000 asset will be fully amortized before any revenue is likely to materialize.

Customer concentration risk is extreme. The logistics business depends on a "limited group of customers" with no diversification. Loss of even one customer could cut revenue by 30-50%, accelerating the path to shutdown. In contrast, competitors like ODFL serve thousands of customers across diverse industries, insulating them from single-customer risk.

The only potential asymmetry is a highly unlikely scenario where a strategic buyer values the Nevada promoter license for its scarcity value. Nevada is a premier jurisdiction for combat sports, and licenses are limited. However, any buyer would still need to deploy capital to monetize the license, making UNXP an unattractive acquisition target at current valuations. A distressed asset sale might recover pennies on the dollar for the license, but equity holders would be wiped out in any restructuring.

Valuation Context: A Speculative Mirage

At $1.20 per share, UNXP trades at a $35.25 million market capitalization and approximately 650 times sales—a multiple that would be absurd for a high-growth software company, let alone a failing logistics operator with zero revenue from its new venture. The enterprise value of $35.24 million (net of minimal cash) implies an enterprise-to-revenue multiple of approximately 650x, a figure that defies rational analysis.

Peer comparisons highlight the absurdity. Old Dominion (ODFL) trades at 6.0x sales with 39.3% gross margins and 25.7% operating margins. Saia (SAIA) trades at 2.8x sales with 24.6% gross margins. XPO (XPO) trades at 2.2x sales with positive free cash flow. Knight-Swift (KNX) trades at 1.1x sales. UNXP's valuation is 108-650x higher than profitable, scaled competitors while delivering negative margins and no growth.

For unprofitable early-stage companies, investors typically focus on revenue multiples, cash runway, and path to profitability. UNXP fails on all counts. The revenue multiple is meaningless given the revenue base is $54,000—less than a typical household income. Cash runway is effectively zero, with $10,380 in cash and negative annual operating cash flow of $15,549. There is no path to profitability; there is only a path to dissolution.

The balance sheet offers no support. Book value of $0.43 per share and price-to-book of 2.80x suggests the market is valuing intangible assets at a premium despite their non-productive status. However, the promoter license's $12.57 million carrying value is likely impaired, meaning true book value may be negative. The company has no debt, but this is not a strength—it reflects an inability to access credit markets due to its non-viable business model.

No comparable transactions exist for a company of this profile. Distressed micro-caps with failed legacy businesses and unexecuted pivots typically trade at a discount to net asset value, not a premium. UNXP's valuation reflects speculative retail interest in the "media and entertainment" narrative, disconnected from any fundamental analysis.

Conclusion: A Lottery Ticket with a Near-Zero Payoff Probability

OZ Vision Inc. represents the terminal phase of a failed logistics operator attempting a desperate pivot into capital-intensive media production without the resources to execute. The central thesis is not one of transformation but of imminent obsolescence. The logistics business, generating $54,000 in annual revenue with negative margins, cannot sustain the company's minimal overhead. The media segment, despite $13 million in intangible assets, produces zero revenue and cannot be activated without capital that would likely destroy existing equity value.

The company's $35 million valuation is a speculative mirage, disconnected from financial reality. Trading at approximately 650 times sales while losing money on every dollar of revenue, UNXP exists in a valuation twilight zone reserved for pre-revenue biotechs with breakthrough IP—not for a logistics relic with a promoter license it cannot use. The going concern warning, $10,380 cash balance, and $1.1 million related-party payable point to insolvency within months, not quarters.

For investors, the only variable that matters is whether the company can secure financing on terms that don't wipe out equity holders. Given its track record, scale, and capital requirements, the probability of a favorable outcome approaches zero. The media assets may have theoretical value in the hands of a well-capitalized operator, but in UNXP's hands, they are stranded assets. The stock is a lottery ticket where the jackpot is a highly dilutive rescue financing and the baseline is zero.