Executive Summary / Key Takeaways

• A Company That Sold Its Past to Fund Its Future: Curis divested its only revenue-generating asset—the Erivedge royalty stream—for $2.5 million in November 2025, leaving emavusertib as its sole viable program and transforming the company into a pure-play bet on a single Phase 1/2 oncology candidate.

• Compelling Early Data in Untapped Niches: Emavusertib has demonstrated a 38% composite complete response rate in heavily pre-treated FLT3-mutated AML patients and achieved undetectable minimal residual disease in 62.5% of frontline AML patients when added to standard care—results that suggest best-in-class potential in indications with no approved therapies.

• Existential Financial Crisis: With only $9.1 million in cash as of September 2025, an accumulated deficit of $1.30 billion, and a going concern warning, Curis must raise substantial capital before Q1 2026 or face delisting and potential bankruptcy, creating a ticking clock that overshadows all clinical progress.

• Competitive Pressure from Next-Generation Platforms: While Curis pursues small-molecule inhibition, rivals like Nurix and Kymera are advancing IRAK4 degraders with potentially superior durability, while Syndax has already commercialized approved therapies in overlapping hematologic malignancies, threatening to make emavusertib obsolete before it reaches market.

• Regulatory Uncertainty Amplifies Execution Risk: FDA reorganization, government shutdowns, and potential drug tariffs create an unpredictable approval pathway, while Nasdaq has already issued a delisting notice for failing to meet $35 million minimum market value requirements, giving Curis until November 14, 2025 to regain compliance.

Setting the Scene: From Royalty Collector to Single-Asset Biotech

Curis, Inc., incorporated in 2000 and headquartered in Lexington, Massachusetts, spent two decades as a biotechnology company that made money by licensing its intellectual property to larger partners. The company's early history was defined by a June 2003 deal with Genentech for Hedgehog pathway antagonists, which yielded Erivedge (vismodegib) for advanced basal cell carcinoma and provided Curis with a modest but reliable royalty stream. This model—developing early-stage science and monetizing it through partnerships—sustained the company through years of losses, accumulating a $1.30 billion deficit by September 2025.

That strategy reached its logical endpoint on November 6, 2025, when Curis sold its entire interest in Curis Royalty LLC to TPC Investments for $2.5 million and release of future royalty obligations. This transaction severed the company's last connection to recurring revenue, leaving it with a single viable asset: emavusertib (CA-4948), an orally available small molecule that inhibits both IRAK4 and FLT3. The divestiture was not a strategic choice but a financial necessity, providing minimal capital to extend operations while eliminating any safety net. Curis is now a binary investment—its survival depends entirely on emavusertib's ability to generate compelling enough data to attract new capital before its cash runs out.

The company operates in a single reportable segment focused on oncology drug development, with emavusertib being evaluated across multiple hematologic malignancies and solid tumors. The competitive landscape has shifted dramatically since Curis's founding. Where small-molecule inhibitors once dominated immuno-oncology, the field now includes protein degraders from Nurix Therapeutics (NRIX) and Kymera Therapeutics (KYMR) that promise more complete target elimination. Meanwhile, Syndax Pharmaceuticals (SNDX) has already commercialized epigenetic therapies and menin inhibitors in AML, establishing real-world evidence and physician relationships that a pre-commercial company cannot match. Curis is not just racing against time; it is racing against competitors with superior capital positions and more advanced technological platforms.

Technology, Products, and Strategic Differentiation: The Dual Inhibition Thesis

Emavusertib's core technological differentiation rests on its ability to simultaneously inhibit IRAK4 and FLT3, a mechanism that management believes addresses adaptive resistance to single-target therapies. In relapsed/refractory AML, where over 80% of patients in the emavusertib study had previously received a FLT3 inhibitor, the drug achieved a 38% composite complete response rate. This compares favorably to gilteritinib's 21% composite CR rate in a less heavily pre-treated population, suggesting that adding IRAK4 inhibition may salvage patients who have exhausted standard options.

The frontline AML triplet study (CA-4948-104) provides more compelling evidence. When added to venetoclax and azacitidine in patients who achieved complete remission but remained MRD positive , emavusertib converted 62.5% of evaluable patients to undetectable MRD within 5 to 8 weeks. This matters because MRD negativity correlates with durable remissions and survival. The data imply that emavusertib can deepen responses to standard-of-care combinations, potentially establishing a new treatment paradigm for frontline AML patients who would otherwise relapse.

In primary CNS lymphoma (PCNSL), an indication with no approved drugs, emavusertib has shown tumor burden reduction in 9 of 13 BTK inhibitor-experienced patients (including 4 complete responses) and 5 of 6 BTK inhibitor-naive patients (including 1 complete response). The FDA and EMA have confirmed that the ongoing TakeAim Lymphoma study could support accelerated submissions, with an objective response rate "north of 25%" deemed sufficient for approval. This regulatory clarity in an ultra-rare indication creates a potential near-term catalyst, though enrollment remains slow at approximately one patient per site per year across 30+ active sites.

The company's broader pipeline includes investigator-sponsored trials in five solid tumor types and planned expansion into chronic lymphocytic leukemia (CLL), where the goal is to convert partial responders to BTK inhibitors into complete remissions with undetectable MRD. However, these programs remain in early stages, with the CLL study not expected to enroll its first patient until late Q4 2025 or early Q1 2026. The technology's ultimate value proposition—enabling time-limited therapy rather than chronic treatment—remains unproven at scale.

Financial Performance & Segment Dynamics: Burning Cash to Buy Time

Curis's financial results reflect a company in managed decline while awaiting a clinical inflection. For the three months ended September 30, 2025, net revenues were $3.2 million, an 8% increase year-over-year, entirely derived from the now-divested Erivedge royalties. For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, net revenues were $8.3 million, a 10% increase. These modest gains are irrelevant to the company's future, as all royalty revenue ceased after the November 6, 2025 divestiture.

Research and development expenses decreased 34% to $6.4 million in Q3 2025 from $9.7 million in Q3 2024, primarily due to lower clinical, employee-related, manufacturing, research, and consulting costs. For the nine months ended September 30, 2025, R&D expenses decreased 24% to $22.4 million from $29.6 million in 2024. While management frames this as disciplined capital allocation, it reflects a company with no choice but to cut spending to match its dwindling cash. General and administrative expenses decreased 3% to $3.7 million in Q3 2025 and 17% to $11.2 million for the nine-month period, driven by lower employee-related, legal, insurance, and consulting costs.

The net loss improved to $7.7 million ($0.49 per share) in Q3 2025 from $10.1 million ($1.70 per share) in Q3 2024, and to $26.9 million ($2.19 per share) for the nine months ended September 30, 2025 from $33.8 million ($5.77 per share) in the prior year. However, this "improvement" is purely a function of reduced spending, not operational leverage or revenue growth. The company used $20.8 million of cash in operations for the nine months ended September 30, 2025, leaving it with $9.1 million in cash and cash equivalents as of September 30, 2025.

Based on its current operating plan, Curis believes its existing cash will fund operations only into the first quarter of 2026. The company has concluded that there are conditions and events that raise substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern within one year after the date the financial statements were issued (November 6, 2025). This is not a hypothetical risk—it is the central reality that defines every strategic decision.

Outlook, Management Guidance, and Execution Risk

Management's guidance is explicitly focused on survival. CFO Diantha Duvall stated on the Q3 2025 earnings call that "our current priorities are clearly to continue the PCNSL trial and obviously launch the newly initiated CLL trial" while acknowledging that "we'll be looking to bring in additional capital prior to the end of the year." This dual mandate—advance clinical programs while securing dilutive or non-dilutive funding—creates inherent tension. Every dollar spent on trials reduces runway, yet trial success is the only way to attract capital.

For PCNSL, management expects to enroll 30 to 40 additional patients over the next 12 to 18 months to support NDA and EMA submissions. With 27 patients treated as of January 2, 2025, and enrollment pacing at roughly one patient per site per year, this timeline appears optimistic. The company anticipates additional data from the study in Q4 2025, which could serve as a catalyst for partnership discussions or equity raises. However, the FDA's reorganization and planned 3,500-person reduction, combined with the federal government shutdown that began October 1, 2025, create uncertainty about the agency's ability to provide timely guidance or accept regulatory submissions.

The CLL study, targeting approximately 40 patients, is expected to enroll its first patient in late Q4 2025 or early Q1 2026, with initial data anticipated at the ASH Annual Meeting in December 2026. This timeline extends well beyond Curis's cash runway, requiring either a significant capital infusion or a strategic partner to fund the program. The AML triplet study has completed the 7-day dosing cohort and is enrolling the 14-day cohort, with management "excited to report progress" at ASH. Yet without a clear path to a registrational study, this program remains a scientific curiosity rather than a near-term value driver.

Management's assumptions appear fragile in light of competitive dynamics. While Curis pursues small-molecule inhibition, Nurix's IRAK4 degrader NX-2127 has already demonstrated responses in B-cell malignancies with potentially more durable activity. Kymera's KT-474, though primarily focused on autoimmune disease, validates the IRAK4 target in oncology. If these degraders show superior efficacy in PCNSL or AML, Curis's data may become irrelevant regardless of statistical significance. The company's outlook implicitly assumes it can outmaneuver better-capitalized rivals with more advanced technology platforms—a high-risk assumption.

Risks and Asymmetries: How the Thesis Breaks

The investment thesis for Curis faces material, interconnected risks that go beyond typical clinical-stage biotech uncertainty. The most immediate threat is liquidity failure. If the company cannot raise capital before Q1 2026, it will be forced to cease operations, rendering all emavusertib data worthless to equity holders. The Nasdaq delisting notice received on August 21, 2025, with an exemption only until November 14, 2025, creates a hard deadline. Failure to regain compliance would decrease liquidity and the ability to raise additional capital, creating a death spiral.

Regulatory disruption poses a second-order risk. The FDA's reorganization under Executive Order 14210, which began layoffs on July 14, 2025, could delay guidance on accelerated approval pathways. The federal government shutdown that started October 1, 2025, has already impacted the FDA's ability to accept user fees and regulatory submissions. While management expresses confidence that prior FDA agreements for PCNSL will be respected, the agency's reduced workforce may be unable to process submissions efficiently. For a company with weeks of cash remaining, any delay is existential.

Competitive obsolescence threatens the core value proposition. Nurix's IRAK4 degrader program, partnered with Gilead (GILD), has demonstrated durable responses in heavily pre-treated patients and benefits from a $428.8 million cash position that funds aggressive development. Kymera's degrader platform, despite recent setbacks, offers potentially more complete target elimination. Syndax's approved menin inhibitor Revuforj generated $32.0 million in Q3 2025 revenue and is establishing real-world treatment patterns that could lock out later entrants. If emavusertib's response rates, while impressive for a small molecule, are superseded by degrader data, Curis's entire pipeline becomes commercially non-viable.

Trade policy and supply chain risks add another layer of uncertainty. Curis relies on third-party contract manufacturing organizations, including one with a Chinese subcontractor and another operating in Canada. President Trump's 10% baseline reciprocal tariff on China and 35% tariff on Canadian imports not covered by USMCA could increase manufacturing costs at the worst possible time. The proposed 100% tariff on branded drugs imported into the U.S., while delayed, threatens to disrupt global supply chains and increase costs for a company with no pricing power.

Execution risk on clinical trials is amplified by resource constraints. The PCNSL study requires enrolling 30-40 patients across 30+ sites in 12-18 months—a pace that demands significant clinical operations investment. Yet R&D spending has been cut by 34% year-over-year. This creates a Catch-22: the company cannot generate compelling data without adequate investment, but it cannot invest without first generating compelling data to raise capital.

Valuation Context: Pricing a Pre-Revenue Biotech with a Gun to Its Head

Trading at $1.17 per share with a market capitalization of $15.0 million, Curis is priced as a distressed asset rather than a going concern.

The enterprise value of $36.55 million is largely meaningless given that all revenue-generating assets have been divested. Traditional valuation metrics are either negative or irrelevant: the price-to-book ratio of -1.01 reflects negative equity, the operating margin of -218% shows no path to profitability, and the return on assets of -61.2% indicates capital destruction.

For a pre-revenue biotech, the only relevant metrics are cash position, burn rate, and pipeline value. Curis has $9.1 million in cash and is burning approximately $5.6 million per quarter in operating cash flow, implying a runway of less than two quarters. This is not a theoretical exercise—the company has explicitly stated it needs to raise capital before year-end 2025. The recent equity offerings in March 2025 ($8.8 million net) and July 2025 ($6.1 million net) demonstrate that capital is available, but at what cost? Each raise dilutes existing shareholders in a company with no revenue and escalating risk of failure.

Peer comparisons highlight the valuation gap. Nurix trades at 23.1x TTM revenue with $428.8 million in cash, reflecting investor confidence in its protein degradation platform. Kymera trades at 164x revenue with a robust balance sheet despite recent setbacks. Syndax, with approved products, trades at 15.9x revenue and is approaching profitability. Curis's 1.29x revenue multiple (on divested revenue) and minimal cash position place it at the bottom of the peer group, reflecting market skepticism about its ability to survive long enough to realize any pipeline value.

The implied valuation of emavusertib is approximately $15 million (market cap) plus the present value of any potential future royalties, discounted heavily for execution risk. For context, Syndax's Revuforj generated $32 million in quarterly revenue in its first year post-launch. If emavusertib could capture similar value in PCNSL (an ultra-rare indication with no competition), peak sales might reach $50-100 million annually. However, the probability-adjusted net present value of that revenue stream, discounted for 5+ years of development risk, regulatory uncertainty, and competitive threats, is likely far below the company's current enterprise value. The market is essentially pricing Curis as a call option with a rapidly expiring premium.

Conclusion: A Binary Outcome with No Margin of Safety

Curis has engineered a singular bet on emavusertib's ability to generate data compelling enough to attract capital before its cash expires. The early clinical signals—38% CR rates in salvage AML, 62.5% MRD conversion in frontline AML, and responses in PCNSL—are scientifically intriguing and suggest the dual IRAK4/FLT3 inhibition thesis has merit. However, these data points exist in a vacuum of financial distress that makes execution nearly impossible.

The central thesis hinges on two variables: whether Curis can secure non-dilutive capital through a strategic partnership before Q1 2026, and whether emavusertib's data can remain competitive against protein degraders and approved therapies from better-funded rivals. If both conditions are met, the stock could re-rate dramatically as the company gains runway to complete PCNSL registration. If either fails, the likely outcome is delisting, restructuring, or liquidation.

For investors, there is no margin of safety. The company's $9.1 million cash position, going concern warning, and Nasdaq delisting notice create a hard deadline that clinical timelines cannot meet. While the science may be sound, the business is broken. Emavusertib's promise is real, but at $1.17 per share, Curis is not an investment in oncology innovation—it is a wager on management's ability to perform CPR on a patient that has already flatlined.