Executive Summary / Key Takeaways

• GPOX has executed a genuine business model transformation, growing annualized revenue nearly 6x to $6.3 million since entering the Direct Store Delivery market in April 2023, with Q3 gross margins expanding to 23.6% as the DSD model gains operational traction.
• The company faces an imminent liquidity crisis with just $37,901 in cash and a working capital deficit of $5.87 million, forcing management to choose between dilutive equity financing and potential operational disruption within weeks, not months.
• Management's target of scaling from 500 to 1,500 serviced stores represents a 3x expansion that could drive revenue per store from $1,000 to $1,500 monthly, but execution requires capital the company does not currently possess.
• The investment thesis hinges entirely on whether GPOX can secure financing on acceptable terms and execute its hub-and-spoke expansion before its balance sheet constraints trigger a going concern event.
• Key risks include material dilution from equity raises, execution failure on rapid store expansion, and the company's ineffective disclosure controls where a single individual controls all financial reporting functions.

Setting the Scene: From Shell Company to AI-Powered Distributor

GPO Plus, Inc. began as Koldeck, Inc., a Nevada shell company incorporated in March 2016, before undergoing two name changes and a leadership takeover by Brett H. Pojunis in May 2020. This history matters because it explains the company's clean-slate transformation potential and its lack of legacy operational baggage. The pivotal moment arrived in April 2023 when GPOX acquired Betterment Retail Solutions, entering the Direct Store Delivery market for convenience stores and gas stations. This acquisition fundamentally rewired the business model from a struggling product developer into a technology-driven distributor.

The company makes money through a four-pillar strategy: developing proprietary products like The Feel-Good Shop+ and Mr. Vapor, distributing them via a "White Glove" DSD service, branding through point-of-sale displays, and driving sales through a technology and data-driven approach. GPOX positions itself as an "AI-powered Distributor" using a hub-and-spoke network anchored by its Lubbock, Texas Regional Distribution Hub, which supports multiple Mini Hubs servicing 100-150 retail locations each. This structure targets the $327 billion convenience store and gas station distribution market identified by Water Tower Research, a TAM that provides credible expansion runway if execution delivers.

GPOX currently services approximately 500 stores with an average monthly revenue per store of $1,000. Management's explicit goal of reaching 1,500 stores while lifting per-store sales to $1,500 through new SKUs and categories defines the core strategic trajectory. The DSD model provides a critical advantage: direct control over merchandising, inventory management, and customer relationships in a fragmented retail channel where traditional distributors leave significant value on the table.

Technology, Products, and Strategic Differentiation

The "AI-powered" label requires scrutiny. While management emphasizes technology-driven distribution, the specific AI capabilities remain loosely defined in public disclosures. The tangible differentiation comes from the DSD service model itself—direct delivery, custom point-of-sale displays, and data-driven inventory optimization for small-format retailers. This matters because it transforms GPOX from a commodity distributor into a service partner, potentially supporting higher margins and customer retention.

The White Glove DSD service, featuring new POS displays for flagship brands, addresses a specific pain point in convenience retail: category management expertise. Most independent gas stations and c-stores lack sophisticated inventory systems, creating opportunity for distributors who can optimize product mix and presentation. GPOX's low minimum order quantities, inferred from its focus on small retailers, lower barriers to entry for store owners and expand the addressable market beyond what large distributors like Core-Mark or McLane (Berkshire Hathaway ) can profitably serve.

The company's R&D investment appears minimal based on financial disclosures, with no separate R&D line item reported. This suggests the "AI-powered" claim may be more marketing positioning than proprietary technology. The real moat, if one exists, lies in execution speed and the hub-and-spoke network economics rather than technological defensibility. This has direct implications for margin durability and competitive vulnerability.

Financial Performance: Growth Meets Cash Burn

GPOX's Q3 2025 results provide the first clear evidence that the DSD model can generate improving unit economics. Revenue grew 32% year-over-year to $1.57 million, while gross profit surged 65% to $371,143, expanding gross margin from approximately 19% to 23.6%. This 460-basis-point margin expansion signals that scale benefits and operational improvements are materializing, validating management's growth thesis.

However, the income statement reveals a company still burning cash. Operating expenses rose 19% to $865,845, reflecting investments in digital marketing, delivery fleet, software, warehouse, and payroll. While expense growth decelerated relative to gross profit growth, the company still posted a $494,702 operating loss and $580,707 net loss for the quarter. The six-month net loss of $1.28 million actually worsened 9% year-over-year due to higher operating expenses and stock-based compensation.

The balance sheet tells the more urgent story. Cash collapsed from $478,225 in April 2025 to $37,901 by October 31, 2025—a 92% decline in six months. Net cash used in operating activities nearly doubled from $410,619 to $774,986 year-over-year. With current assets of just $265,563 against current liabilities of $6.14 million, the working capital deficit of $5.87 million creates a solvency question that management's commentary cannot ignore.

The $45.05 million cumulative deficit represents years of accumulated losses, but the immediate concern is liquidity. At current burn rates, GPOX has weeks of cash remaining, not months. This financial reality directly contradicts management's optimistic growth narrative and represents the single largest risk to equity holders.

Outlook, Guidance, and Execution Risk

CEO Brett H. Pojunis states GPOX is "operating in full growth mode" and "executing multiple revenue-generating programs simultaneously." The company reaffirmed its sprint to 1,500 stores, call center expansion, and new beverage line development. This signals management's conviction that operational momentum can overcome financial constraints.

The guidance implies significant operational leverage. Scaling from 500 to 1,500 stores triples the revenue base, while increasing per-store sales from $1,000 to $1,500 adds another 50% uplift. Combined, this could theoretically drive annual revenue toward $27 million (1,500 stores × $1,500/month × 12 months), representing a 4x increase from the current $6.3 million run rate. However, this math assumes perfect execution, no competitive pushback, and sufficient capital to fund inventory, vehicles, and working capital for 1,000 new store relationships.

Management's commentary reveals the fragility of these assumptions. The increase in revenue for Q3 is attributed simply to "increase in the availability of inventory," suggesting growth is supply-constrained rather than demand-driven. This implies execution risk around procurement, logistics, and working capital management. The company also notes it "expects to generate additional losses for the foreseeable future while we establish our business," explicitly acknowledging that profitability remains distant.

Risks: The Thesis-Breaking Factors

The going concern warning in GPOX's financial statements represents more than boilerplate risk language. The auditor's conclusion that "substantial doubt about the ability of the Company to continue as a going concern for a reasonable period of time" directly threatens equity value. If GPOX cannot secure financing, the business could face bankruptcy or fire-sale acquisition regardless of operational progress.

Dilution risk is immediate and severe. Management's plan to obtain capital from "management and significant shareholders" and "third-party equity and/or debt financing" will likely result in highly dilutive terms given the company's distressed position. The company acknowledges that "issuance of additional shares will result in dilution to our existing stockholders," and with 85.3 million shares outstanding at $0.09, even a modest $1 million capital raise could increase share count by 10-20% at current prices.

Execution risk compounds financial risk. GPOX's disclosure controls are ineffective because "only one individual, our sole officer and director, reviews, evaluates, approves, and records transactions and initiates journal entries." This concentration of financial control in a single person creates fraud risk and operational errors that could derail the expansion plan. For a company attempting to scale operations 3x, this governance weakness is material.

Competitive vulnerability remains untested. While GPOX targets a $327 billion market, it competes against well-capitalized regional distributors and national players like Core-Mark (CORE) (an ITW (ITW) company) and McLane (Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A)). These competitors have established supplier relationships, sophisticated logistics networks, and balance sheets that can weather market volatility. GPOX's small scale and limited brand recognition create customer acquisition costs that may prove uneconomical without sustained capital investment.

Competitive Context: Small Fish in a Large Pond

Competitive analysis has sometimes incorrectly framed GPOX as a healthcare GPO competitor to Premier (PINC), Cardinal Health (CAH), and McKesson (MCK). This is factually inaccurate based on GPOX's actual business model. The company operates in convenience store distribution, not healthcare group purchasing. This mischaracterization highlights the company's limited analyst coverage and the market's poor understanding of its positioning.

In reality, GPOX competes in a fragmented DSD market where scale determines purchasing power and route density drives profitability. Large distributors achieve 3-4% net margins through volume and operational efficiency. GPOX's -37.0% profit margin reflects its pre-scale status. The company's potential advantage lies in its technology positioning and focus on underserved independent retailers, but this remains unproven at scale.

In the absence of direct competitor financial comparisons, investors must evaluate GPOX on absolute metrics. The 2.37x EV/Revenue multiple on trailing twelve-month revenue of $4.74 million suggests the market is pricing in some probability of survival and growth, but the metrics quickly deteriorate from there. The relevant benchmark is not other distributors' multiples but rather GPOX's ability to survive long enough to achieve scale economics.

Valuation Context: Distressed Pricing for a Distressed Balance Sheet

At $0.09 per share, GPOX trades at a $7.68 million market capitalization and $11.21 million enterprise value. The 2.37x EV/Revenue multiple on trailing twelve-month revenue of $4.74 million suggests the market is pricing in some probability of survival and growth, but the metrics quickly deteriorate from there.

The company's gross margin of 23.85% is improving but remains below distribution industry standards of 25-30% for scaled players. The operating margin of -31.53% and net profit margin of -37.0% reflect the company's heavy investment phase and small revenue base. These negative margins make earnings-based multiples meaningless, forcing investors to focus on revenue multiples and balance sheet strength.

GPOX's balance sheet metrics are alarming. The current ratio of 0.08 and quick ratio of 0.07 indicate severe liquidity constraints. Negative book value of -$0.09 per share means equity has been eroded by cumulative losses. Return on assets of -235.66% demonstrates capital inefficiency at current scale.

The company's cash position of $37,901 against six-month operating cash burn of $774,986 implies less than one month of liquidity at current spending levels. This makes the stock a binary option: either GPOX secures financing and executes its growth plan, creating potential multi-bagger returns, or it faces restructuring that could wipe out equity holders.

Peer comparisons are unavailable for relevant DSD competitors, but the valuation framework is clear: GPOX must be priced on survival probability and post-financing dilution, not traditional fundamentals. A successful $2-3 million capital raise at current prices would dilute existing shareholders by 26-39% but provide 12-18 months of runway to prove the 1,500-store thesis.

Conclusion: A Transformation on the Brink

GPO Plus has engineered a legitimate operational turnaround, growing revenue nearly 6x and expanding gross margins since its DSD pivot. The company's hub-and-spoke model, focus on underserved convenience stores, and targeted expansion to 1,500 stores represent a coherent strategy for capturing share in a $327 billion market. Management's execution on the operational front has been credible, with 32% quarterly revenue growth and improving unit economics.

The investment case, however, faces a singular overriding risk: balance sheet viability. With $38,000 in cash and a $5.87 million working capital deficit, GPOX must secure financing within weeks, not months. The terms of this financing will likely be highly dilutive and may fundamentally alter the risk-reward equation for existing shareholders. The company's ineffective disclosure controls and concentration of financial authority in one individual add governance risk to an already precarious situation.

For investors, the thesis boils down to two variables: the terms of imminent capital raising and management's ability to execute the 1,500-store expansion before cash runs out. If GPOX can secure non-dilutive or modestly dilutive funding and demonstrate consistent store-level economics, the current $0.09 price could represent a compelling entry point. If financing comes with onerous terms or execution falters, equity value could approach zero. The operational story is promising; the financial reality is stark.