Seritage Growth Properties (SRG)

Executive Summary / Key Takeaways

• Liquidation Race Against the Clock: Seritage Growth Properties is executing a Plan of Sale approved in October 2022, with just 13 properties remaining and $200 million in term loan debt maturing July 2026, creating a binary outcome where successful asset sales could generate meaningful distributions but failure risks equity wipeout.

• Operating Cash Burn Creates Urgency: The company burned $33.7 million in operating cash during the first nine months of 2025 while generating only $14 million in revenue, forcing complete reliance on asset sales to fund obligations and leaving no margin for execution errors or market deterioration.

• Asset Sale Execution is Everything: Management has four properties under contract for $240.8 million in gross proceeds, but only $170 million from three assets is considered probable, leaving a thin cushion to cover the term loan and casting doubt on the timing and certainty of remaining sales.

• Legal Overhang Adds Uncertainty: A class action lawsuit filed in July 2024 alleging false disclosures about internal controls and asset valuations, plus derivative lawsuits against officers and directors, creates potential liability and distraction that could impair sale processes or reduce net proceeds available to shareholders.

• The Asymmetry: If Seritage can sell its remaining assets at near-book value, the company could generate sufficient proceeds to fully repay debt and distribute residual value to shareholders; if market conditions force fire-sale prices or sales fail to close before the July 2026 maturity, the equity could be rendered worthless.

Setting the Scene

Seritage Growth Properties began as a highly specialized real estate vehicle, not a traditional operating company. Founded on June 3, 2015, and commencing operations on July 7, 2015, Seritage was created through a rights offering to Sears Holdings (SHLDQ) shareholders to acquire $2.7 billion of Sears-owned properties and joint venture interests. This origin story explains everything about its current predicament: the company was never designed to be a permanent enterprise, but rather a mechanism to extract value from Sears' real estate footprint as the retailer collapsed.

The company's business model has always centered on monetizing former Sears and Kmart locations through redevelopment, densification, and ultimate disposition. Seritage's core strategy involves leasing built space, achieving entitlements , modifying agreements, and positioning properties for sale to maximize shareholder value. This approach differs fundamentally from traditional retail REITs like Simon Property Group or Kimco Realty , which operate properties as ongoing income-generating businesses. Seritage, by contrast, is a liquidation vehicle in practice, even before it formally adopted a Plan of Sale.

Effective January 1, 2022, Seritage revoked its REIT election and became a taxable C corporation, a move that provided flexibility to retain cash for debt repayment and asset enhancement rather than distributing 90% of taxable income. This transition coincided with the Board's initiation of a strategic review in March 2022, culminating in shareholder approval of a Plan of Sale on October 24, 2022. The Plan empowers the Board to sell all assets, distribute net proceeds, and dissolve the company. Since then, Seritage has sold 91 consolidated properties and 12 unconsolidated interests, generating approximately $1.1 billion and $159.6 million in gross proceeds respectively, reducing its portfolio to just 13 properties totaling 1.3 million square feet and 198 acres across six states as of September 30, 2025.

The retail real estate industry faces challenging market conditions that directly impact Seritage's ability to execute its liquidation strategy. Elevated interest rates, constrained debt and equity capital availability, and macroeconomic uncertainties including supply chain disruptions and tariff impacts have created a difficult environment for asset sales. These conditions pressure valuations and limit the pool of qualified buyers, particularly for larger, more complex redevelopment sites. Unlike its larger competitors who can weather cyclical downturns through diversified income streams, Seritage's liquidation timeline leaves no room for waiting out market softness.

Strategic Differentiation and Execution Challenges

Seritage's purported competitive advantage lies in its specialized redevelopment expertise for former Sears properties. The company has accumulated institutional knowledge about transforming large-format, often obsolete retail boxes into multi-tenant, mixed-use destinations. This expertise theoretically allows Seritage to unlock value that traditional buyers might overlook, creating a spread between acquisition cost and realized sale price.

However, this advantage is rapidly diminishing as the portfolio shrinks and market conditions deteriorate. With only 13 properties remaining, the scale necessary to support a dedicated redevelopment organization has evaporated. General and administrative expenses decreased $2.3 million in the third quarter of 2025 due to reduced staffing, but the company still recognized $6.5 million in severance expenses during the first nine months. This cost structure reflects a business that is downsizing faster than it can monetize, creating negative operating leverage.

The company's Florida concentration—generating 54.5% of rental income for the nine months ended September 30, 2025—exposes it to regional market risk. While Florida's population growth has supported real estate values, rising insurance costs and climate risks create long-term headwinds. The Aventura, FL property alone drove the $1.7 million increase in rental income for the third quarter, yet this same property required an $0.8 million impairment when transferred to held-for-sale status, illustrating the fragility of reported values.

Management's strategy to enhance sale value through leasing and entitlements faces a fundamental timing mismatch. The company needs to fund $200 million in debt obligations within 18 months, but achieving entitlements and securing quality tenants requires years, not quarters. This creates a forced trade-off between maximizing proceeds and ensuring survival, likely pressing the company to accept lower offers to meet near-term maturities.

Financial Performance as Evidence of Strategic Failure

Seritage's financial results for the nine months ended September 30, 2025, demonstrate why the company cannot continue as a going concern without immediate asset sales. Total revenue of $14.037 million represents a 6% increase year-over-year, but this nominal growth masks the underlying deterioration. Rental income grew to $13.586 million, yet cash-basis net operating income collapsed to $1.740 million from $2.507 million in the prior year period. The third quarter was even more alarming, with cash-basis NOI plummeting to $0.235 million from $2.256 million in Q3 2024—a 90% decline that signals the operating business is no longer viable.

The company reported a net loss of $63.130 million for the nine months, an improvement from the $142.185 million loss in the prior year, but this "improvement" resulted primarily from reduced impairments ($18.8 million versus $87.5 million) rather than operational strength. Impairment losses of $18.8 million during 2025 reflect the company's acceptance of offers below carrying value, a direct admission that book values overstated market values. The $0.8 million impairment on the Aventura property in Q3 required transferring it to held-for-sale at the lower of book value or fair value less costs to sell, demonstrating how quickly valuations can evaporate.

Operating cash flow tells the most damning story. The company burned $33.7 million in operating cash during the first nine months of 2025, a figure that dwarfs the $14 million in revenue. This means property rental income did not come close to covering property operating expenses, general and administrative costs, and debt service. The $43.6 million in net investing cash inflows from asset sales provided temporary relief, but this source is finite and dwindling as the portfolio depletes.

The balance sheet reveals a company living on borrowed time. As of September 30, 2025, the outstanding principal on the Term Loan Facility was $200 million, down from $1.6 billion at inception, but still representing a massive claim on a company with $14 million in annual revenue. The loan, held by Berkshire Hathaway Life Insurance Company of Nebraska (BRK.B), has been amended multiple times to provide flexibility, including a maturity extension to July 31, 2026, contingent on principal reductions. Seritage met the $800 million threshold by July 31, 2023, through a $230 million voluntary prepayment, and has since repaid a total of $1.55 billion since December 2021. However, the remaining $200 million still represents an existential threat.

Outlook, Guidance, and Execution Risk

Management's commentary reveals both progress and profound uncertainty. CEO Adam Metz stated on November 14, 2025, that the company expects near-term closings for three assets under contract with no due diligence contingencies, which would generate $170 million in gross proceeds and allow for a "sizeable prepayment" of the Term Loan Facility before year-end. This statement, while optimistic, contains critical caveats: the sales are "not guaranteed," and the proceeds would only partially address the $200 million obligation.

As of November 13, 2025, Seritage had four consolidated properties under contract for $240.8 million in gross proceeds, but $70.8 million of these proceeds are from assets with contingencies outside the company's control and are not considered probable for going concern analysis. The company is also negotiating sales for one additional property ($11 million) and two unconsolidated properties ($38.5 million in distributions), but these are similarly excluded from probability assessments. This distinction between "under contract" and "probable" is crucial—it means management cannot assert with confidence that sufficient proceeds will materialize to fund all obligations.

The Term Loan Facility's maturity date of July 31, 2026, creates a hard deadline. On July 30, 2025, Seritage paid a $4 million extension fee to extend the maturity from 2025 to 2026, a costly decision that signals the company needed more time but also consumes precious cash. The loan agreement allows sales to unaffiliated third parties without administrative agent consent, provided net proceeds are deposited into a controlled account, giving Seritage operational freedom but no financial relief from the principal obligation.

Management has explicitly concluded that its current plans do not alleviate substantial doubt about its ability to continue as a going concern until asset sales are sufficient to cover obligations or alternative financing is secured. This statement, required by accounting standards, is not boilerplate—it represents management's honest assessment that the company faces potential insolvency if asset sales falter.

Risks and Asymmetries

The most material risk is the going concern qualification itself. If Seritage cannot generate sufficient proceeds from its remaining 13 properties to repay the $200 million Term Loan Facility by July 2026, the company faces several unpalatable options: distressed asset sales at fire-sale prices, a negotiated debt restructuring that likely wipes out equity holders, or bankruptcy proceedings. The fact that management has already concluded that "substantial doubt" exists means this risk is not remote—it is the baseline scenario that must be overcome.

Market conditions pose a second critical risk. The company continues to face "challenging market conditions such as elevated interest rates and the availability of debt and equity capital," which "adversely impact the Plan of Sale proceeds from our assets and the amounts and timing of distributions to shareholders." While interest rates have begun to decline from 2022 peaks, they remain high relative to historical norms, compressing capitalization rates and reducing buyer appetite for complex redevelopment projects. If these conditions persist or worsen, the $240.8 million in anticipated gross proceeds could prove optimistic, forcing the company to accept lower prices or extend the sales timeline beyond the July 2026 maturity.

Legal risks compound the financial pressures. A class action lawsuit filed on July 1, 2024, alleges false disclosures concerning internal controls and asset valuations, seeking damages for securities law violations. Three derivative lawsuits filed in January and May 2025 assert breach of fiduciary duty against officers and board members, echoing the class action claims. As of November 2025, two derivative actions were consolidated and stayed pending resolution of an anticipated motion to dismiss in the class action. While Seritage intends to "vigorously defend itself," the litigation creates uncertainty that could deter potential buyers, delay sales processes, or result in settlement payments that reduce net proceeds available for debt repayment and shareholder distributions.

The concentration risk in Florida, where 54.5% of rental income originates, creates geographic vulnerability. Any regional economic slowdown, hurricane damage, or insurance market disruption could impair the value of the company's most important assets. The Aventura property, which contributed significantly to the third quarter's revenue increase, also required an impairment when moved to held-for-sale status, demonstrating how quickly local market conditions can erode valuations.

On the positive side of the asymmetry, if Seritage successfully closes its contracted sales at near-book value and quickly negotiates additional transactions, the company could generate proceeds well in excess of its $200 million debt obligation. With a book value of $6.00 per share and a stock price of $3.42, the market is pricing in a significant discount to liquidation value. If management can execute efficiently, shareholders could receive a distribution that represents a substantial premium to the current trading price. However, this upside scenario requires perfect execution in a difficult market with no margin for error.

Valuation Context

At $3.42 per share, Seritage trades at a market capitalization of $192.63 million and an enterprise value of $338.36 million, reflecting the $200 million in term loan debt. The price-to-book ratio of 0.57 suggests the market values the company at a 43% discount to its reported book value of $6.00 per share. However, for a company in liquidation, traditional valuation metrics are less meaningful than the estimated net proceeds from asset sales relative to debt obligations.

The company's gross margin of 4.61% and operating margin of -99.89% demonstrate that the operating business is not viable as a going concern. These metrics are irrelevant for a liquidation scenario but underscore why the company cannot afford to hold and operate properties. The return on equity of -19.66% and return on assets of -3.94% reflect the destruction of capital that has occurred throughout the redevelopment process.

More relevant is the relationship between anticipated sale proceeds and debt. The $240.8 million in gross proceeds from four contracted properties, if realized, would comfortably cover the $200 million term loan. However, netting out transaction costs, taxes, and other obligations would reduce the amount available for shareholders. The fact that the stock trades at a 43% discount to book value suggests the market doubts either the realizability of the reported asset values or the ability to complete sales before the debt maturity.

Comparing Seritage to its retail REIT peers highlights its unique situation. Simon Property Group (SPG) trades at 26.85x earnings with a 4.83% dividend yield, reflecting its status as a stable, income-generating enterprise. Kimco Realty (KIM) trades at 24.70x earnings with a 5.16% yield, while Regency Centers (REG) trades at 31.31x earnings. These multiples are irrelevant for Seritage, which generates no profit and pays no dividend. The Macerich Company (MAC), which trades at a loss and has negative profit margins, is the closest comparable, yet even Macerich operates as a going concern with 95%+ occupancy and positive NOI growth.

For Seritage, the only valuation metric that matters is the estimated net liquidation value per share. If the company can generate $200 million in net proceeds from its remaining properties, repay the term loan, and distribute the residual after paying preferred obligations and expenses, the per-share amount would depend on final transaction prices and timing. The current stock price appears to embed a significant probability of a zero outcome, with any positive distribution representing upside optionality.

Conclusion

Seritage Growth Properties represents a pure-play liquidation investment where the outcome will be determined by the company's ability to sell its remaining 13 properties before its $200 million term loan matures in July 2026. The central thesis is binary: successful execution could generate meaningful distributions to shareholders, while failure risks complete equity loss. This is not a real estate operating company but a timed exercise in asset monetization under adverse market conditions.

The company's financial performance confirms that the operating business is no longer viable. A 90% collapse in quarterly cash-basis NOI, $33.7 million in operating cash burn, and explicit management statements about substantial doubt create urgency that cannot be overstated. The asset sale process is progressing—$240.8 million in contracted sales demonstrates buyer interest—but the gap between "under contract" and "probable" proceeds reveals execution risk that the market has priced in through a 43% discount to book value.

For investors, the critical variables are the closing of the three non-contingent asset sales expected to generate $170 million, the subsequent negotiation of additional transactions, and the resolution of legal overhangs that could impair buyer confidence. The July 2026 maturity date provides a clear catalyst, but also a hard constraint in an environment of elevated interest rates and constrained capital. Seritage's story is not about navigating market cycles—it is about racing against time, where every month of delay increases the probability of a distressed outcome and every successful closing brings the potential for value realization closer to reality.